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Introduction 
This paper is concerned with assessing the influence 
of the attitudes of the members of the Court of Appeal 
in the interpretation of s.108 of the Land and Income 
Tax Act 1954, in the period 1966 to 1975. During this 
period the provision read as follows: 
"Every contract, agreement, or arrangement 
made or entered into, whether before or 
after the commencement of this Act, shall be 
absolutely void (as against the Com.missioner for 
income tax purposes) in so far as, directly or 
indirectly, it has or purports to have the 
purpose or effect of in any way altering the 
incidence of income tax or relieving any person 
from his liability to pay income tax." 
The words shown in brackets were inserted in the 
section in the amending Act of 1968. 
It appears that the main reason for the repeal 
of this section in 1974 and insertion of a new, much 
more detailed, provision was because of the confusion 
and inequities which had resulted from the line of cases 
attempting to interpret it. 
Before examining the effects the differing attitudes 
of the members of the Court of Appeal who h e ard these 
cases it should be noted that these attitudes should 
in theory be irrelevant in any tax case. This is b e cause 
taxation is imposed solely by statute. There is no conunon 
law or equitable doctrine imposing any obligation 
upon any person to pay taxes. Thus in construing a 
revenue provision it is clear that the Courts should 
have regard to nothing but the text of the Act in question. 
It is, however, generally accepted that this theory 
bears no resemblance to the practice which has developed. 
Not only have the personal attitudes of the judiciary 
been ascertainable from their judgments, but also those 
attitudes have apparently changed in the course of the 
ten year period. That this is undesirable has been 
recognised by the repeal of the section. Nevertheless the 
question still remains whether the blame for the development 
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of a 'world of fiscal phantasy' noted by McCarthy P. 
in Gerard (p.280 - 281) rests with the members of 
the Court, for allowing personal attitudes to 
influence their approach, or in the section, which 
defied interpretation on any other basis. 
PART I 
THE INTERPRETATION OF s.108, UP TO THE PRIVY COUNCIL DECISION 
IN MANGIN 
(1. 01) 
(1.01) 
Decisions Prior to Elmiger 
Although a general anti-avoidance provision had been 
present in New Zealand income tax legislation since 1891 
it was not until the mid 1960s that the Conunissioner 
seriously sought to invoke it. This has led one conunentator 
to suggest that: 1 
"To talk of s .10 8 as having 'imposed a liability' 
with the 'authority of Parliament' is historical 
fantasy. Parliament did not 'authorise' anything. 
The Commissioner and the Courts took a discarded 
relic of the land tax and tried to make it work, 
making them, and not the legislature truly the 
lawgiver to all intents and purposes." 
Certainly the first two attempts by the Conunissioner 
gave little indication of the impact the section was to have. 
In Lewis v CIR ll96~/ NZLR 634 the Commissioner sought 
to challenge an arrangement whereby a partnership of 
solicitors provided their wives with finance to buy a 
bookkeeping machine which they then hired back at realistic 
hiring rates. The appellants sought to deduct the hire 
charges from the income returned by the partnership. However, 
the Commissioner refused to allow the deductions and added to 
the assessment of each appellant the amount of his wife's 
income from the hire charges. Hardie-Boys J. upheld th2 
appellant's objection, stating (p.637): 
"I am satisfied that, unless, as a matter of law, 
the transaction with the wives can be set aside as 
a sham, it cannot be attacked under s.108." 
The learned Judge purported to reply on decisions 
to the Australian equivalent sections and also on the famous 
'laissez-faire' decision in IRC v Duke of Westminster il93§/ AC l 
but the decision does not stand up to critical analysis. 2 
1. L. McKay. Section 108 and the Issue of Legislative 
Proprietyil97§7NZLJ 238 at 242. 
2. Transactions which are mere shams have always been 
open to attack by the Revenue, without express 
statutory authority. 
(1.01) 
There does, however, seem. to be some basis for the 
inference that the learned Judge's sympathies lay in the 
first instance with the taxpayer who simply chose one 
(legal) method of arranging his affairs which attracted 
less tax than another, albeit unusual. 3 
Purdie v CIR (1965) 9 AITR 603 concerned a veterinary 
surgeon who created a charitable trust with which he formed 
a partnership. The appellant loaned money on interest 
free terms to the Trustees who bought premises for the 
partnership. The trust was thereby entitled to a one-fifth 
share in the profits. Wilson J. held that any diminution 
of the appellant's income was merely incidental to the 
charitable purposes of the appellant and thus the arrangement 
did not fall within the "predication" test enunciated by 
Lord Denning in Newtown v C of T L'l95~/ AC 450 at 465. 
However, he went on to hold that the appeal would also 
succeed on the basis that the section can only apply to 
present liabilities, because of the difference in the wording 
of our section from s.260 of the Australian Act. 4 It is 
this second conclusion which is the most significant. In 
reaching it, Wilson J. made no reference to the purposes 
of the provision, or the effect such a construction would 
have on its application. As far as can be ascertained 
from the judgment, he was solely concerned with interpreting 
the plain and literal meaning of the words used, uninfluenced 
by the policy arguments for and against such legislation. 
Neither of these cases was taken further by the Commissioner 
and at this stage it appeared that his 'new' line of attack 
would be virtually ineffective. 
3. Note the two hypothetical cases Hardie-Boys J. discusses 
at pp636-637 which he considers to be unquestionable. 
4. s.260 of the Commonwealth of Australia Income Tax and 
Social Services Contribution Assessment Act reads: 
Every contract, agreement or arrangement made or 
entered into, orally or in writing, whether before 
or after the conunencement of this Act, shall so far 
as it has or purports to have the purpose or effect 
of in any way, directly or indirectly -
(a) altering the incidence of any income tax; 
(1.01) 
(b) relieving any person from liability to pay 
any income tax or make any return; 
(c) defeating, evading or avoiding any duty or 
liability imposed on any person by this Act; or 
(d) preventing the operation of this Act in any 
respect, 
be absolutely void as against the Commissioner, 
or in regard to any proceeding under this Act, 
but without prejudice to the validity as it 
may have in any other respect or for any other 
purpose. 
(1.02) 
(1. 02) 
Elmiger In The Supreme Court 
In Elmiger v CIR s.108 was successfully invoked by the 
Commissioner for the first time, seventy years after the first 
general anti-avoidance provision relating to income tax was 
enacted in New Zealand. The arrangement in that case had 
many similar features to that unsuccessfully challenged in 
Lewis v CIR. The appellants, who worked in a partnership as 
earthmoving contractors, sold earthmoving machinery to a 
family trust, the purchase price being by way of interest free 
loan payable on demand. The appellants contemporaneously 
agreed to hire back the machines for minimum monthly charges. 
The appellants deducted from their assessable income the 
amounts so paid. Thus the arrangement resulted in income 
splitting between the taxpayers and their family trust 
by means of contrived deductions which gave the trust an 
annual income taxed at a lower rate, and effectively reduced 
the appellants' tax by reducing their assessable income. 
The case was heard in the Supreme Court before 
Woodhouse J. His approach provides a valid contrast with 
that taken b y both Wilson J. and Hardie-Boys J. in the two 
earlier cases. His judgment contains a thorough a~alysis 
of decisions on the Australian equivalent section, but of greater 
significance is the clear expression of his attitude towards 
tax avoidance arrangements and general anti-avoidance provi 3ions 
such as s.108. 
While the previous two decisions demonstrate an attitude 
towards tax avoidance similar to the laissez-faire approach 
exemplified in the statement of Lord Clyde in Ayrshire Pullmdn 
Motor Services v IRC (1929) 14 TC 754 at 763 
" ••.•.. no man in this country is under the smallest 
obligation, moral or other so to arrange his legal 
relations to his business or to his property as to 
enable the Inland Revenue to put the largest possible 
shovel into his stores." 
Woodhouse J's approach has been described as one more 
attuned to the type of society in which we live. 1 His attitude 
1. I.L.M. Richa rdson. Attitudes to Income Tax Avoidance 
Inaugural address VUW 18 Apl 19G7, at p.l. 
(1. 02) 
is apparent in this statement (p.686): 
"There has been a growing awareness by the 
Legislature and the Courts alike that ingenious 
legal devices contrived to enable individual 
taxpayers to minimise or avoid their tax liabilities 
are often not merely sterile or unproductive in 
themselves (except perhaps in respect of their 
tax advantages for the taxpayer concerned), but that 
they have social consequences which are contrary to 
the general public interest." 
In considering general anti-avoidance provisions the Judge 
later stated (p.687): 
"I think these provisions are intended to forestall 
deliberate attempts by individuals to obtain tax 
advantages denied generally to the same class of 
taxpayer. That the Legislature should attempt to 
anticipate these manoeuvres is not surprising; nor 
can it be thought unfair to those affected if the 
method adopted by the Legislature should be, as in 
the case of lthis sectio~j the method of general 
proscription." 
Having clearly indicated his position, the learned 
to follow Lewis v CIR and held that s.108 applied to real as 
distinct from sham transactions. He then went on to deal with 
the objections raised by the taxpayer's Counsel to the applicatio 
of the section to the facts involved. 
He dismissed the contention that s.108 could operate only 
in respect of arrangeme nts altering the incidence of or liabilit 
for tax on income already derived on the basis that the word 
'relieve' had the same meaning in s.108 as 'avoid', as used 
in s.260 of the Australian Act. 2 His Honour thus disagreed 
with the conclusion reached by Wilson J. in Purdie v CIR and 
his reasons for so doing appear to be influenced by the desire 
2. In Newton the argument was presented to the Privy Council 
that the liability to which s.260 applied was a liability 
which had already accrued. The Privy Council rejected 
this argument on the basis the paragraph (c) of s.260 
referred, by use of the word 'avoid', to anticipated or 
future liability. 
(1.02) 
that the section be effective. Woodhouse J. said (p.692) 
"Lfh~7 whole purpose L~f s.10~7 appears to be to 
effect a general proscription of schemes which 
would have the effect of diverting potentially 
taxable income outside the ordinary operation of 
the Act and thus preventing a liability for tax on 
that income from coming into existence. I find 
it impossible to interpret the section in terms of 
some illogical intention to confine it to existing 
liabilities." 
The taxpayers' objection that s.108 cannot apply to 
bar deductions otherwise allowable under s.111 was also 
dismissed. Woodhouse J. distinguished Cecil Bros. Pty Ltd 
v C of T (1964) 111 CLR 430 and stated (p.693): 
"I can see no reason why s.111 should act in such 
a way as to override the effect of s.108." 
Woodhouse J. thus saw s.108 as applicable in the circumstances, 
and effective to enable the Commissioner to disallow the 
deductions relating to the hiring charges. He saw the 
section applying to avoid even family or business dealings 
(p.694): 
"If there is associated with them the additional 
purpose or effect of tax relief (in the sense 
contemplated by the section) pursued as a goal 
in itself and not arising as a natural incident 
of some other purpose." 
Elmiger's case is of vital importance in any discussion of 
the case law on s.108, not only because it was the first 
case argued before the Court of Appeal on s.108, but because 
of the judgment of Woodhouse J., which clearly evinced a 
new approach in New Zealand to tax avoidance arrangements, 
and significantly influenced the decisions of the Court 
of Appeal in that case and those which rapidly followed it. 
The former Minister of Justice, Dr Martyn Finlay, said of 
Elmiger that it represented the high point in the Court's 
interpretation of s.108 from which they have since tended to 
retire. 3 Woodhouse J's forceful support for the effectiveness 
3. (1974) NZPD 4193 
(1.02) 
and desirability of general anti-avoidance provisions such 
as s.108 is a striking indication of the movement to a 
broader and less literal interpretation of revenue legislation. 
This approach must inevitably involve applying moral precepts 
as it is based on the individual Judges conception of what 
the taxpayer "ought" to pay. The literal approach meant 
that this obligation was determined solely by the strict 
construction of the relevant taxing provision. The "broader" 
approach which is epitomized in Woodhouse J's judgment in 
Elmiger requires the Judge to have some preconceived idea 
of the "purpose" of the Legislation which he applies in the 
absence of clear guidelines within the statutory provision. 
Woodhouse J's judgment in Elmiger is undoubtedly a 
well written and forceful opinion. In view of the case 
law which followed, it also must be seen as being 
unquestionably sound in law, but each of the major issues 
offered an alternative approach which the words of the 
section could equally well have supported. 4 The 
Australian case law could easily have been distinguished.
5 
But having unequivocally expressed his views that tax 
avoidance schemes are contrary to the general public interest 
and that anti-avoidance provisions designed to thwart these 
are to be expected, it is not surprising that he chose 
the interpretations which gave the section the most effect and 
potency. The fact that his conclusions were followed in the 
Court of Appeal and indeed by the Privy Council 
may mean that they were correct, or it may mean that similar 
attitudes were held by the majority of Judges who heard those 
cases. The true position may be, however, that any inter-
pretation of s.108 which could be made inevitably required 
that the judge adopt a standpoint from which to evaluate 
the facts in issue. The words of the section were so broad 
and discretionary that they simply could not be given a 
literal translation. 6 
4. These alternatives are discussed in para (1.03) in 
relation to the Court of Appeal's judgment. 
5. s.260 is clearly different because of the two extra 
limbs which do not appear in s.108. 
6. A view later expressed by McCarthy P. in Gerard (p.281). 
(1. 03) 
(1.03) The Court of Appeal in Elmiger 
The Court which heard the appeal from Woodhouse J's 
decision in Elmiger was composed of the same members -
North P., Turner and McCarthy ~J. -who heard the following 
three appeals relating to s.108. Individually their impact 
was even greater than collectively. North P. was President 
of the Court in the first five of the ten cases which were 
heard concerning the application of s.108 in the period 
1966 - 1976. Turner J. was a member of the Court on six 
of those occasions. McCarthy J. heard eight of the appeals, 
being absent from the Court on the fifth and sixth occasions 
that the section was argued. 
The influence of these three Judges, both as a Court 
and individually, was clearly an integral part of the 
development of the "glosses" placed by the Courts on the 
provision: 
" ••.•.. it is in the nature of the judicial 
process to hedge generality with specific 
rules, limitations and qualifications. Elmiger 
itself began that process and it was carried 
forward in every significant decision up to 
and including the Gerard decision of the Court 
of Appeal. The result ...... was that the 
provisions of s.108 themselves ended up as having 
very little to do with s.108 litigation. What had 
a great deal to do with the litigation were the 
specific criter ia and qualifications contained 
in the decisions themselves." 1 
The approach of the members of the Court of Appeal in 
Elmiger thus set the scene for the decisions to follow. 
The Court was faced with a provision cast so wide that the 
language could reasonably be construed either to be 
inapplicable to all but a restricted (and unlikely) class 
of transactions, or to apply to almost all business and 
family transactions in which tax factors are a significant 
element. It is thus left to the Court to confine the 
1. L. McKayLl9727 NZLJ 238 at 239. 
(1.03) 
provision within reasonable limits, if it was to find it 
applicable to all. This process is clearly more suited 
to the Legislature as it must involve consideration of 
moral and policy factors. Although in Elmiger the 
Court could at least turn to the decisions on the equivalent 
Australian section this in itself involved making some 
sort of moral judgment as there was ample justification 
for refusing to consider them at all. 2 By adopting the 
tests they did, the members of the Court provided convenient 
guidelines and 'tests' for the later Courts to follow if they 
chose, and spared them from the clearly distasteful process 
of deciding openly on subjective moral criteria alone. 
The individual judgments in Elmiger thus require 
consideration, not so much in order to determine the 
principles enunciated therein, as to find the basis (if any) 
upon which those principles were selected. 
Submissions made for the Appellants 
The first ground of appeal was that s.108 operated 
inter partes and not fiscally, since liability to pay 
income tax does not arise until an assessment is made 
by the Commissioner and no agreement can possibly relieve 
the tax payer of this liability as against the Corrunissioner. 
It was also argued that s.108 applied only to 
arrangements which affect an accrued liability for income 
tax. It was submitted that the Australian decisions to 
which Woodhouse J. referred, and which applied s.260 to 
avoid arrangements affecting future liability, relied on, 
or were at least coloured by, limb (c), which uses the 
word 'avoid'. The words 'relieve' and alter' were 
referable to a later point in time, namely once liability 
had accrued. 
2. See Turner J. at p.185, McCarthy J. at p.189 
(1. 04) 
(1.03) 
A third submission, that s.108 could not apply 
to bar deductions otherwise allowable under s.111, 
was abandoned in argument. 
The Judgment of North P. 
The President agreed with Woodhouse J. in dismissing 
the appellants' arguments. He saw the Privy Council 
decisions in Newton and Peate as directly applicable and 
the difference in the wording of the provisions of no 
importance in the case in issue. 
Having summarised the history of the provision, North P. 
examined the Australian cases of Newton, Hancock v Federal 
Commissioner 108 CLR 258 and Peate v Federal Commissioner 
111 CLR 443 (HCA) in order to discover the interpretation 
placed by the Courts on the Australian section. He 
concluded that if the New Zealand provision was to be 
interpreted in the same way, then the Commissioner had 
acted correctly. He stated (p.179): 
"I L~om~7 unhesitatingly to the conclusion that 
the appellants adopted this arrangement for the 
primary purpose or object of avoiding income 
tax. In my opinion, if I may adopt the words 
of Kitto J. 'The arrangement bears ex facie 
the stamp of tax avoidance.' The facts speak 
not in a whisper but in a loud and clear voice." 
His rejection of the submission that s.108 could only 
apply inter partes does not deal with the reasoning put 
forward by counsel, that liability to pay tax does not arise 
until an assessment is made. The second submission of the 
appellants was also emphatically rejected. North P. saw 
the reasoning of Lord Denning in Newton as applicable 
despite the different words used. Perhaps his real reason for 
taking this approach appears from this sentence (p.182): 
"In my opinion, to adopt the suggested 
construction would stultify the section." 
If North P. decided to reject the alternative argument 
simply because to do otherwise would prevent s.108 having 
its "intended" effect it is submitted he was clearly 
influenced by his personal view of what the Legislature 
intended to prevent. One may perhaps point to s.S(j) 
(1. 05) 
(1. 04) 
Acts Interpretation Act 1924 to show that this approach 
is sanctioned and indeed required by the Legislature, 
but Judges have not, in other circumstances, been unwilling 
to find a construction of a statutory provision which 
renders the provision of limited or no effect. 1 As 
Rowlatt J. pointed out in Cape Brandy Syndicate v IRC 
fl9217 IKB 64 at p.71: 
"In a taxing Act one has to look merely at what 
is clearly said. There is no room for any 
intendment. There is no equity about a tax. 
There is no presumption as to a tax. Nothing is 
to be rea d in, nothing is to be implied. One 
can only look fairly at the language used." 
The conclusion at which North P. arrived may well be the 
'proper' one, but the approach he took can be seen as 
influenced by the sorts of considerations Woodhouse J. 
expressed in his judgment. 
Turner J. in Elmiger 
Although Turner J. also dismissed the appeal and 
upheld the Commissioner's assessment, his judgment 
proceeds on rather different grounds than that of 
the President. He began by expressing his view that 
the facts "demonstrate overwhelmingly" that the principal 
purpose of the arrangement was the deduction from the 
appellant's income of substantial sums by way of hire for 
the plant.1 He then proceeded to consider whether the 
section was effective to avoid an arrangement having this 
purpose. He rejected the proposition that s.108 could 
not apply fiscally on the ground that s.77 imposes 
liability to pay tax whenever income is derived, and 
thus before an assessme nt is made. 
As to the second submission of the appellants, 
Turner J. saw 'relieve' as applying at least to situations 
(L 04) 
(1. 05) 
1. Auckland Modica l Aid Trust v A.G. - unrer:orted 24 Sep. 1975 
1. at p.183 
(1. 06) 
(1. 05) 
where a taxpayer enters into an arrangement whose 
purpose and effect is to reduce the burdens of tax 
which would otherwise be payable on the income which 
he actually derives, although he left open the question 
whether s.108 could apply if the taxpayer actually derived 
less income and thus less tax. 
In contrast to the approach taken by North P. His 
Honour did not consider the Australian cases because of their 
reliance on the word 'avoid' appearing in limb (c) of s.260. 
He did nevertheless adopt the test from Newton~ widely 
known as the "ordinary business or family dealing" test 
and concluded that, applying this test (p.188): 
"I have not the slightest doubt ....•. that 
the transaction under consideration emerges 
as one contravening the section." 
Turner J. was rather more careful to relate his conclusions 
to what was actually said in the provision, rather than 
what was intended to be said, but it may be that the test 
that he adopted, that of determining whether the arrangement 
is capable of ordinary business or family dealing, r equires 
in itself some application of subjective criteria by the Judge. 
If the arrangement is to be considered "ordinary" by refer-
ence to how often the same arrangement occurs in other 
dealings of that kind, then Elmiger should have won. 
The arrangement was widely used at that time - Elmiger 
was a test case. If, on the other hand, the test is to 
be applied according to what the Judge sees as "proper" 
ordinary business or family dealing, moral precepts are 
then surely applied. 
McCarthy J. in Elmiger 
McCarthy J. began his judgment by dismissing the 
applicability of the Australian cases, stating that 
the Court should have strict regard to the facts. He did, 
however, see the test to be applied to determine the 
purpose and effect of the arrangement as that enunciated 
in Newton and also adopted by Turner J. In applying this 
test he stated (p . 189): 
"I view what happened here as an obvious 
2. as enunciated by Lord Denning at p.466. 
(1.06) 
and deliberate attempt by the appellants 
to rid themselves of the payment of tax." 
The use of the words 'obvious' and 'deliberate' suggest 
that such an arrangement, whether or not legally effective, 
is at least morally wrong. The section required the 
Court to ascertain whether the purpose or effect of the 
arrangement was to in any way alter the incidence of 
income tax or relieve any person from his liability to 
pay income tax. The Newton test, which McCarthy J. 
purported to adopt, 1 provides that such purpose or effect 
is ascertained by looking at the arrangement itself, 
irrespective of the motives of the parties. One wonders 
then why McCarthy J. considered it necessary to label 
the arrangement as 'obvious' and 'deliberate' unless he 
was in fact passing some sort of moral judgment on the 
appellants. 
With regard to the appellants' submission that one 
cannot alter the incidence of income tax before liability 
to that tax has accrued through assessment, McCarthy J. 
acknowledged that the argument may have some validity 
where the income itself is not derived by the taxpayer, 
but said that in Elmiger's case the argument had no merit 
as the income was derived by the appellants. His Honour 
considered the arrangement was invoked once income was 
derived, and at that point one could truly say the 
effect of the arrangement was to relieve the appellants 
from tax they would otherwise have to pay. Thus he 
implicitly followed Turner J. in holding that liability for 
tax arises not on assessment but on derivation of income. 
1. at p.188 
(1. 07) 
(1. 07) 
Marx V CIR, Carlson V CIR 
Because of the similarities in the issues raised 
by these two cases, they were, by consent, heard together. 
It is sufficient to look only at the facts of Marx for 
the purposes of this discussion. 
In discussing Elmiger it was noted that both Turner 
J. and McCarthy J. expressly reserved the questions as to 
whether s.108 would apply where, pursuant to the arrangement 
attacked by the Commissioner, the taxpayer did not derive 
the income at all. Two years later Marx v CIR, heard before 
the Chief Justice in the Supreme Court, brought this point 
directly into issue. 
A trust had been created for the benefit of Marx's 
wife and children, the trustees being a public accountant 
and a local farmer. By a contemporaneous agreement the 
taxpayer leased his farm, implements and dairy herd to 
the trust for two years at a realistic rental and 
the trustees purported to engage the objector as manager 
of the farm at a realistic salary. 1 He was also authorised 
to operate the Trust's bank account. As a result of this 
arrangement the profit from the farming operations 
which had previously been included in the taxpayer's 
assessable income was now derived by the Trust. The 
taxpayer derived only his salary, the rental for his farm 
from the trust, and profit from pigs which he ran on his own 
account. The Commissioner attacked the arrangement under 
s.108 and declared that by virtue of its provisions the 
arrangements made between the trustees and the objector 
were void. 
The Chief Justice upheld the Commissioner's assessment 
on the basis that (p.469): 
"No one would regard these arrangements as capable 
1. found by Wild C.J. p.468 
(1.07) 
of explanation as ordinary business dealings. 
Nor would I have thought them capable of 
explanation as ordinary family dealings." 
He considered that even if they were so regarded, the 
end in view was relief from the taxpayer's liability 
to pay income tax and thus the arrangements were void. 
He saw the income as assessable to the taxpayer on the 
basis that the taxpayer in fact earned the income 
"by the sweat of his own brow" and once the Commissioner 
had successfully avoided the arrangements he was 
entitled to assess the taxpayer (p.473): 
"On the income he would have received if the 
arrangements coming within s.108 had not 
been made." 
The Appeal was heard by the same Judges who heard Elmiger, 
and the arguments put forward by Counsel for the appellants 
bear some resemblance to those put forward in that case. 
They related primarily to the effectiveness of s.108 to 
annihilate arrangements which avoid future liability 
to tax, particularly where the income in question is 
itself not derived by the taxpayer. It was also contended 
that if the arrangements were avoided, no taxable situatio~ 
would arise because all the moneys in question were paid 
directly into the trust's bank account and never passed 
through the taxpayer's hands. 
From Elmiger it appeared that the Court was not 
prepared to "stultify the section" and, for this reason 
at least, decided that it was effective to avoid arrangement3 
which relieved the taxpayer from paying income tax on 
income actually derived by him. However, as two of the 
members of the Court of Appeal 2 had clearly limited 
their consideration to this situation only, Marx provided 
ample opportunity for the Court to find s.108 ineffective 
to catch situations where the income itself was not in 
fact derived by the taxpayer. 
2. Turner J. and McCarthy J., see paras (1.05), (1.06). 
(1. 08) 
(1. 08) 
North P. in Marx 
At the outset the President re-iterated his view 
that the difference in the language of the New Zealand 
section as compared with the Australian section had no 
practical significance despite the absence of limbs (c) 
and (d) . 
After giving a brief summary of the facts he stated 
(p.192): 
"In my opinion there is no doubt at all that both these arrangements would have been caught under the Australian section and, likewise, would have been caught under the earlier New Zealand section. I reject out of hand the submission of counsel for the appellants that these arrangements can be regarded as a permissible form of family arrangement." 
Presumably North P. was here referring to the Newton 
test which was adopted in Elmiger and which excepted from 
the operation of the section those arrangements which were 
ordinary business or family dealings. As mentioned earlier 
in this paper, it seems doubtful whether this test can be 
objectively applied as it depends upon how one determines 
what is an "ordinary family dealing". In Marx's case 
evidence was given to show that this type of arrangeBent 
was very common in the area in which the appellant lived. 
If frequency of occurrence does not make an arrangement 
'ordinary' it is difficult to see what would. Also, North P. 
talked of "permissible" family arrangements. Permitted by 
whom? If this means legally permissible then it would seem 
that North P. was arguing in circles. In order to determine 
whether an arrangement is legally effective (that is, 
whether it survives annihilation by s.108) it must first 
be determined whether it is legally permissible. If, on 
the other hand "permissible" means morally acceptable, 
this is clearly not a judgment that the Court is entitled 
to make. 
With regard to the lengthy and detailed submissions 
(1.08) 
made on behalf of both the appellant and respondent as 
to the application and effect of s.108 once a tax 
avoidance scheme is revealed, North P. stated (p.194): 
"Surely,simply as a matter of common sense 
it is plain that the arrangements were directed to 
altering the incidence of income tax for which they 
otherwise in due course would become liable and 
consequently resulted in their being relieved from 
their liability t~ pay income tax. In my opinion 
the argument of fcounsel for the appellant§/ 
to the contrary involved critical refinements 
and subtle distinctions which should be avoided 
and the obvious and popular meaning of the 
language should be preferred." 
By adopting a "common sense" approach North P. 
considered that it was "but a short step 111 from the 
decision in Elmiger to say that the words of s.108 
also applied to the case where the taxpa yer, by operation 
of the arrangement, derived neither the income nor 
liability for tax on that income . Because the money 
was derived by the appellant's family, whom he would 
otherwise be required to support out of his own net 
income, North P. concluded (p.195): 
" ..... in my opinion, he is reducing the 
burden of income tax on what is really 
in truth his income and thus has not only 
altered the i ncide nce of income tax, but, 
has reliev ed himself of his liability to 
pay income tax." 
The other major obstacle for the Commissioner was 
the problem of the consequences of annihilation of the 
arrangement& S .108 clearly did not allow any reconstruction, 
so that the annihilation would only b e effective if it 
left the income in question in the taxpayer's hands and 
thus taxable to him. In Elmiger there was no difficulty 
as the income was in fact derive d by the taxpayer, but 
in Marx, the money nev er passed through the taxpayer's 
hands, the profits from the farm were paid straight into 
the trust's bank account. 
North P. was content to adopt the reasoning of 
1. at p.188 
(1. 09) 
(1. 08) 
the Chief Justice who, by following Peate's case, 
considered that the Commissioner was entitled to assess 
the taxpayer on the income he would have derived had 
the arrangements not been entered into. North P. 
added (p .19 7) : 
"I think in point of fact it was established 
that the income in question throughout was 
under the control of the appellants and to 
that e xtent might be said to have passed 
through their hands." 
Accordingly he dismissed the appeals. 
It is submitted that here, even more clearly than 
in Elmiger, North P. determined whether or not the 
arrangements should be struck down on the basis of 
whether or not they were morally acceptable. As in 
Elmiger, his decisions may well be justified in legal 
terms, but this is not apparent in his judgment. For 
the reasons that both Turner and McCarthy J.J. gave 
in Elmiger it was not really acceptable to cons~der 
the Australian cases as applicable and thus sufficient 
authority upon which to decide the present case. Further, 
if one is to take a "common sense" view and interpret 
words according to their "popular and obvious meaning" 
surely one is colouring them with the sorts of moral 
considerations the Courts try to avoid. 
North P. relied heavily on the Australian cases, 
particularly Peate and Newton, to support his approach. 
Ignoring for a moment the difference in wording of the 
two sections, it is interesting to note how the 'moral' 
determinations made in one case become 'legal' justification 
for a later one. 
McCarthy J. in Marx 
In Elmiger McCarthy J. expressly reserved his 
opinion on whether s.108 could apply to arrangements 
whereby the taxpayer actually derives less income, 
inferring that he considere d such arrangements would 
probably be outside the ambit of the section. Here 
he changed his mind, stating (p.218): 
"I believe that the discussion regarding the 
(1. 09) 
different nuances of the time element 
involved in the verbs 'alter,' 'relieve' 
and 'avoid' has clouded the real purpose 
of the section and obstructed the way in 
which it must be regarded." 
Yet it is because of those very differences in meaning 
that McCarthy J. excluded consideration of the Australian 
cases.l 
As further support for his change of heart, the 
learned Judge formulated a new approach to interpretation 
of the section. Instead of looking at the arrangement 
in question at the time when it was entered into he suggested 
that the correct approach was to look at the arrangement 
at the end of the income year and compare the result 
with what would have happened had the transaction not been 
entered into. 
The difficulty with this approach is that any 
transaction which resulted in a taxpayer paying less tax 
would fall within it. Thus McCarthy J. recognised that 
the Newton predication test would also need to be 
fulfilled. In relation to this secondary test his Honour 
stated (p. 218): 
"By introducing this later test the Privy Council 
gave life and reasonableness to the section, and 
when that is fully appreciated, the re is no need, I 
think, for involved considerations based on 
individual words in the section." 
If, in this statement, McCarthy J. was asserting that 
by applying the test one no longer needed to have regard 
to the words of the section, his reasoning would seem 
questionable. A judicial test, particularly one based 
on the Australian provision recognised by the learned Judge 
himself as being materially different from s.108, should 
not become a replacement for the words of the section. 
Having stated his view that the appellants were within 
1. at p. 215 
(1.09) 
the scope of the section, McCarthy J. corrunented (p.219): 
"Such a reading conforms to what I conceive to 
be a conunonsense view of the section, one 
which takes into account its nature and its 
purpose. The tide is running strongly these 
days in favour of a conunonsense as opposed to 
a purely technical reading of income tax 
legislation." 
If one accepts that it is a judicial role to interpret 
this legislation, then what 'tide' was McCarthy J. 
referring to? It seems to be an extreme application of the 
doctrine of stare decisis to feel bound to follow judicial 
attitudes as well as decisions. 
McCarthy J. continued: 
"It is, I think, unlikely that the Legislature in 
the midst of a most expensive war would have 
intended to restrict the operations of the section 
by confining it to accrued liabilities to tax, 
and would have intended to release such an obvious 
way of reducing the impact of tax as we are here 
concerned with." 
With respect, this argument provides no support 
whatever for the approach of the learned Judge. Firstly 
in 1916, when the provision was amended to its present 
form, the sophisticated tax planning techniques which have 
become prevalent in recent years would not have been in 
contemplation, as taxation rates were not high enough 
to provoke them. Thus the Legislature certainly would not 
have intended to restrict the operations of the section, 
but they might simply not have anticipated that result. 
FurtheL the Court should not interpret legislation 
according to the supposed intentions of Parliament. As 
Lord Wilberforce asserted in Mangin v IRC (p.845): 
"There are suggestions in the Court of Appeal 
that the truncated section may be construed 
according to a supposed legislative intention 
not to weaken a tax position in ~he middle 
of a major war. But I cannot accept this as 
a legitimate method ....... We must take 
the section as we find it: If it is weaker 
than the Australian counterpart , at least it 
may create less difficult cases." 
Having thus determined the effectiveness and applicability 
(1. 10) 
(1. 09) 
of s.108 McCarthy J. concluded with only brief discussion 
that the appellants' transactions satisfied his 'predication 
test' and could thus be avoided. His Honour recognised 
that reconstruction was necessary in order to make the 
income taxable to the appellants, however he cited both 
Peate and Newton as authorities approving (p.221) 
"of the principle of assuming that what 
was not in fact received, had been." 
It is interesting to note how McCarthy J. was prepared 
to retreat from his attitude in Elmiger, where he recognised 
that s.108 might not be effective to catch precisely the 
type of arrangements he found within the ambit of 
the section in this case. 
Turner J. in Marx 
Turner J's dissenting judgment in this case provides 
a vivid contrast with those of the other two members of 
the Court. His dissent related solely to the application 
of s.108 to arrangements whereby the taxpayer does not 
derive the income upon which the disputed tax is payable 
at all. He accepted without discussion that were s.108 
identical with the Australian s.260 then the arrangements 
would be caught and that the Newton 'predication' t e st 
was satisfied. However the learned Judge considered 
that both limbs of the New Zealand section were effective 
only to catch arrangements whereby the taxpayer actually 
derives the income though he alters or relieves his 
liability for tax thereon. Turner J. stated (p.201): 
" ...... no duty is cast upon anyone by the 
statute to derive any specified amount of 
income, or indeed any income at all; if 
he choose to derive no income ...... he is 
in breach of no statutory duty. And, so 
ordering his life, he will be under no 
liability to pay income tax." 
Turner J. considered in detail the different possible 
interpretations which could be given to the words of s.108. 
He divided the types of arrangements which the Commissioner 
sought to avoid into three main classes. The 'deduction' 
(1.10) 
cases he saw as clearly within the terms of both limbs 
of s.108. The 'conversion' cases he expressed no 
definite opinion on, though he inferred (p.204) that 
they also would be within the 'relieving' limb of the 
section. The third class to which His Honour referred 
are the 'spreading' cases, of which Marx was one. Because 
in this class the taxpayer does not in fact derive the 
income Turner J. considered that s.108 was inapplicable 
and that the Australian cases in this class were decided 
solely on the 'avoiding' limb of their statute. 
Both North P. and McCarthy J. referred to the history 
of the New Zealand legislation and used their interpretation 
of it as support for their conclusions. Turner J. found 
support f or his (dissenting) view in his interpretation. 
He stated (p.208): 
"The history of the sections appears ..... . 
to demonstrate that the Legislature, 
for reasons to it seeming good, deliberately 
decided in 1916 to delete from the Act that 
phase on which alone, up to the date of these 
appeals, it has proved possible successfully 
to conte~d that a transaction can be avoided 
because by virtue of it a taxpayer fails 
to derive income which, but for it he might 
have derived." 
It is submitted that this quota tion embodies the 
essential difference in approach of the members of 
the Court. McCarthy J. found support for his c ontrary 
view because he was prepared to deduce a legislative 
intention from the above facts.l So too was North P. 2 
On the other hand, Turner J. here recognised that the 
only intention which one could infer was that arising 
from the fact that an amendment took place, that it was not 
for the Court to d e cide why it occurred. 
Having dea~t with the issues under consideration, 
Turner J. went on to give his views on the correct judicia l 
1. at p.219. 
2. at p.193 
( 1.10) 
approach to the interpretation of revenue statutes. 
He stated (p.208): 
"I have been brought up in the belief that 
moral precepts, admirable as they are as 
a guide to private conduct, have no place 
in the determination of liability to pay 
income tax, It may be held morally or 
ethically wrong, no doubt, to evade or 
avoid a liability to pay income tax which 
the statute imposes; but I know of no moral 
or ethical principle by virtue of which it 
can be said that every citizen ought to bear 
his 'proper share' of the burden on tax, or 
that it is 'wrong' or 'unfair' or 'unjust' 
to avoid incurring a liability to pay income 
tax which is not imposed by the statute in 
the circumstances which in the events occur." 
and later, (p.209): 
"To avoid liability for income tax, in a word, is 
not 'wrong', 'unfair', or 'unethical' per se: 
it may be morally wrong, unju s t or unfair, if, 
and because it is a breach of the revenue laws, 
but i f it is not a breach of the revenue laws 
such words as 'unfair,' or 'unjust', cannot 
properly be used of it." 
The l9arned Judge went on to show the dangers of approaching 
a revenue statute with a preconceived notion that the 
avoidanc e of tax is wrong or unfair. He stated (p.210) 
"This is arguing in a circle, and involves 
assuming one's conclusion as a commencing 
propo s ition ...... These cases cannot be 
approa ched by postulating that it is morally 
wrong to e scape payme nt of tax by transactions 
the result of which is to minimise or escape 
liability. The approach must b e to s e e whether 
such tra ns a ctions are blearly a nd unambiguously 
forbidden by the words of the statute. Where this 
is so the effe ct will be to levy tax upon the 
taxpayer, notwithstanding the transactions -
not because he has 'wrongly' or 'unfairly' 
attempted to escape tax, but because he has 
done so in breach of the statute." 
That Turner J. was moved to make these statements is note -
worthy, fi r stly as a force f ul and unequivocal expression 
of his opinions o f the judic i a l role in sta tutory 
interpreta tion, but more importantly as a reflection of 
his conce rn at the approa~h tuken by the other members of 
the Court. 
(1.11) 
(1.11) 
CIR V Mangin 
The Court of Appeal delivered judgment in Mangin's 
case on the same day as the judgment in Marx was delivered. 
The facts were in many respects very similar, the only 
material differences being that in Mangin the taxpayer 
leased only one paddock of his farm to the family trust, 
and only for one year, so that the following year he 
could lease another. The proceeds from the sale of 
the crops grown on the paddock were in each year received 
by the taxpayer who then accounted for them to the trustees. 
In the Supreme Court Wilson J. found in favour of 
the taxpayer on the basis that the overt acts did not 
compel the conclusion that they were devised as a means 
of relieving him from his liability to pay income tax.
1 
ln the Court of Appeal this decision was reversed. 
The arguments relating to the application of the section 
had been covered by the extensive discussion given by 
the Court in Marx, thus the only point which was considered 
was whether Wilson J. was correct in concluding that the 
arrangement was capable of explanations by reference to 
ordinary family dealing and thus was not necessarily a 
means to relieve any person from liability to pay income 
tax. The important features were that the respondent 
leased only wheat paddocks, on an annual basis, to the 
trust and that the trustees were at virtually no risk 
in accepting the lease. The members of the Court 
unanimously agreed that this was not an ordinary family 
dealing. North P. stated (p.234): 
11 
•••••• I find it quite impossible to accept 
the argument for the respondent that the 
arrangement was capable of explanation as an 
ordinary busine ss dealing. No sensible farmer 
would dream of entering into an arrangement 
of such a nature. Can it be capable of explanation 
as an ordinary family dealing? In my opinion 
it certainly c a nnot." 
' 
Turner J., who reiterated his opinion that s.108 was 
1. fI97Q7 NZLR 222 nt 227. 
(1.12) 
(1.11) 
7 
not apt to catch the transactions for the reasons 
he gave in Marx, agreed with the Presidents' view 
of the purpose and effect of the arrangement and 
concluded, (p.236): 
" ...... that the only proper inference to be 
drawn from the facts of the arrangement, and 
of the profits resulting therefrom, is that 
this scheme was devised for the sole purpose, 
or at least the principal purpose, of bringing 
it about that this taxpayer should escape 
liability on tax for a substantial part of the 
income which, without it, he would have derived." 
The Privy Council in Mangin 
The respondent then appealed to the Privy Council, 
providing the Judicial Committee with their first 
opportunity to consider s.108 and thus reject or 
approve the approach taken by the Court of Appeal. 
Although the appeal was dismissed, some of the statements 
made by Lord Donovan in the majority opinion significantly 
altered the approach of the New Zealand Courts in the 
later cases. 
At the outset Lord Donovan restated the principle 
cited by Turner J. in Marx that moral precepts are not 
applicable to the interpretation of Revenue Statutes. 
The applicability of the Australian cases was reinforced, 
as it was stated that (p.839): 
"In the ordinary use of language one 'secures 
relief from tax' if one 'defeats' it or 
'evades' it or 'avoids' it; and their 
Lordships think that the true reason for 
the omission of these words from the present 
s.108 ...... is probably that they were 
regarded as tautologous. Moreover, to 
construe s.108 as refe~ring only to liabilities 
which had already accrued would be to deprive 
it of almost all effect .... " ' 
This was clear support for the approach adopted 
by North P. and McCarthy J. in Marx. With respect to 
the tests enunciated by the Court of Appeal as to when 
s.108 could apply, tl1eir Lordships adopted the proposition 
(1.12) 
stated by Turner J. in Mangin, to become known as the 
'sole or principal purpose test.' (p. 841) 
One of the most important conclusions of the 
Board concerned the consequences of annihilation. While 
considering that the case in issue did not give rise to 
any problems because of the fact that the taxpayer did 
receive the income in his hands, they noted that in a 
situation where this did not occur (such as in Marx) 
the Judges must refuse to fill the gap, as this would 
amount to unauthorised reconstruction. Thus Lord Donovan 
stated (p. 841) : 
" ..... strictly the question is not whether the 
diverted income 'was really in truth his income' 
but whether s.108 had the effect of making that 
which was not in truth the appellant's income, 
but instead that of the trustees, nevertheless, 
become the appellant's income for the purposes 
of the 1954 Act." 
The Majority opinion of the Judicial Comi~ittee thus left 
the decision of the Court of Appeal in Marx open to question. 
The most significant consequence of the Privy Council 
decision in Mangin was its influence on the approach 
of the Court of Appeal in the cases which followed. Apart 
from the annihilation/reconstruction point, their Lordships 
had simply give n support to the conclusions of North P. and 
McCaLthy J. in the Court of Appeal, though they e xpressly 
approved of the approach of Turner J. However these 
formulations and interpretations of s.108 had now become 
unquestionably 'legal' tests and interepretations, whatever 
the original reason for their use. For this reason the 
app roach of the Court of Appeal changeo· The application 
and technical effectiveness of the section was now 
determined and the Judges became increasingly more 
concerned with examining the taxpayers purpose. 
PART II 
POST MANGIN ORDINARY BUSINESS AND FAMILY DEALING AND TEE 
CONSEQUENCES OF ANNIHILATION 
(2.01) 
(2.01) 
Wisheart v CIR: The facts 
The next case concerning s.108 to reach the Court of 
Appeal after the Privy Council decision in Mangin was 
Wisheart v CIR. The approach of the Court was notably 
different from that taken in the earlier decisions. 
"In the cases decided in the mid-1960s and 
up to Mangin in 1970 the New Zealand Commissioner 
faced one technical argument after another 
attempting to constrict the scope of the section. 
After Mangin the contest in the Courts tended 
to focus on the annihilation consequences of 
the section and the application of the Newton 
and Mangin tests in specific fact circumstances, 
although arguments as to the scope of the 
section continued to be raised." 1 
In the Supreme Court the case was heard by Wild C.J., 
who discussed the facts in some detail. (p.435) 
The important features of the arrangements under attack 
were as follows: The appellants were solicitors in 
partnership. One of the appellants and his wife had 
earlier formed a company, Marlborough Developments Limited, 
which had never operated. Shares in this company were 
transferred to family trusts set up for the benefit of the 
appellants' families. Three separate arrangements were 
then entered into which the Commissioner considered were 
void under s.108. 
The first arrangement concerned the hire, by Marlborough 
Developments Limited of two dictating machines from 
Trafalgar Supplies Limited (a quite separate and independent 
company). These machines were then rehired by the 
appellants at an amount slightly higher than that paid by 
Malborough Developments Limited, thereby creating a profit 
in the company's hands. The appellants sought to deduct 
the amounts so paid from their gross income. 
The second arrangement involved the resignation of 
1. I.L.M. Richardson 'And now the New Section 108' [1974] 
NZLJ 560 at 562. 
(2.01) 
the appellants from an insurance agency which, at their 
request, was transferred to Marlborough Developments Limited. 
The appellants continued to do all the work involved in 
the agency without charge to the company. 
Under the third arrangement the appellants assigned to 
the company the lease of their office premises, sold to it 
their furniture, library and equipment, and terminated 
the employment of their staff. Marlborough Developments 
Limited agreed to supply the appellants with premises, 
furniture, equipment and staff for an amount which exceeded 
by fifteen per cent the amounts which the appellants had 
previously paid for those services. 
The taxpayers' contentions were that the arrangements 
were not within s.108, being capable of explanation by 
reference to ordinary business or family dealing. In 
the alternative they argued that even if s.108 did apply, 
no taxable situation could be found without reconstruction. 
They also contended that s.108 could not apply to bar 
deductions otherwise allowed by s.111 - the argument which 
had been abandoned on appeal in Elmiger, though possibly 
resurrected in the Court of Appeal's judgments in Europa (No.1) 2 
The Chief Justice found no difficulty in upholding 
the Commissioner's reassessment. He considered that all 
three arrangements had as their sole or principal purpose, 
tax avoidance. In respect of the first two arrangements 
he stated (p.440): 
"I need waste no words on these. Each was 
patently a scheme of tax alteration and 
relief as surprising, when found within 
the legal profession, as it was bold." 
Neither did the Chief Justice find any problem in revealing 
a taxable situation once the arrangements were annihilated. 
2. Note p.389 per North P., p.430 per McCarthy J. 
(2. 02) 
{2.01) 
Applying Peate, he held that the Cormnissioner was entitled 
to assess the taxpayers on the basis of what their income 
would have been had the arrangements not been made. 3 
The Court of Appeal and the 'Ordinary Business or 
Family Dealings Test 
In between the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal 
decisions in Wisheart the judgment of the Court of Appeal 
in Europa (No.1) had been given, as had the opinions of the 
Judicial Committee in both Mangin and Europa (No.1). 
The effect of the Mangin decision was to put to an end 
further debate on the technical effectiveness of s.108, 
affirm the use of the Newton 'predication' test - though 
with Turner J's 'sole or principal purpose' test as an 
added criterion - and reopen the question of the consequences 
of annihilation. 
The appellants in Wisheart thus reasserted their 
argument that their arrangements were referable to 
ordinary business or family dealing and thereby not within 
the scope of s.108. 
This contention was dismissed in remarkably short and 
unequivocal fashion by all three of the Judges. North P. 
considered the arrangement was "patently a scheme of tax 
alteration." There are two features worthy of corrunent 
which appear from the learned President's discussion of this 
point. Firstly he adopted the words of the Chief Justice, 1 
referring to the scheme as being ~s surprising as it was bold 
when found within the legal profession'.2 It is not irmnediately 
apparent why both of these Judges found it necessary to 
mention the appellants' profession. It cannot have been 
because such arrangements are less likely to be found in 
the legal profession than in any other profession or type 
of business, as many legal firms have leasing arrangements, 
(2.01) 3. It must be noted that Wild C.J. gave his judgment 
in Wisheart in June 1969, while the Privy Council 
opinion in Mangin was not delivered until October 
1970. ---
(2.02) 1. Quoted in para (2.01) 
2. at p. 320 
(2.02) 
often with family companies. The irresistible inference 
is that both Judges found the arrangement undesirable 
and especially so because it was entered into by members 
of their own profession. 
This inference is supported by the second feature 
of note in North P. 's comments on the purposes of the 
arrangements. As was noted in earlier discussion of his 
judgment in Elmiger, 3 North P. in that case referred to 
'permissible' family dealings. In Wisheart he stated (p.321) 
" ...... I reject out of hand the submission 
of Lcounse1 for the appe11ants7 that this 
arrangement can be regarded as a permissible 
form of family arrangement." 
As was noted earlier, such an alteration of the Newton 
test cannot be justified by the words of the section, nor 
can it be justified in the light of the Privy Council's 
adoption in Mangin of the unadulterated 'ordinary business 
or family dealings' test. It would appear that North P. 
took little heed of Turner J's warning, repeated by the 
Privy Council, that moral precepts have no place in the 
interpretation of taxing statutes. 
Turner J. only briefly mentioned the Newton test, 
holding that the 'inference is irresistible' (p. 330) 
that the arrangement was entered into so as to avoid tax. 
Haslam J's comments, in his first and only judgment 
in the Court of Appeal on s.108, gave a clear indication of 
his views. He stated (p.335): 
"It is not surprising that in his discussion 
of the f a cts, the learned Chief Justice 
considered that the guile and persistence 
of the appellants merited some degree of 
censure, since their long term objectives 
were obvious on the face of the whole 
series of transactions." 
His Honour then referred to the comment of Lord Donovan in 
Mangin, that words in revenue statutes are to be given 
their plain meaning. That Haslam J. found it necessary 
to censure the appellants in such outspoken terms is in 
itself surprising. The learned Judge continued (p.336): 
3. par a ( 1 . 0 3) 
(2.03) 
(2.02) 
"With all the astuteness inherent in this 
transaction, it cannot be justified as an 
ordinary business dealing." 
One wonders whether Haslam J. considered that 'business 
dealings' necessarily exhibit a lack of astuteness. 
As Lord Wilberforce stated in his (dissenting) 
opinion in Mangin 4 the problem for the courts, following 
the formulation of this test, was to decide how 'ordinary' 
a transaction had to be to escape The test did nothing 
to alleviate the problem of subjective determination, as 
can be seen from the approaches taken by North P. and 
Haslam J. in Wisheart. 
The Section 108/Section 111 Relationship. 
The appellants argued that a deduction which is 
allowed by virtue of s.111 could not be attacked under 
s.108. In the Court of Appeal in Europa (No.l) North P. 
appeared to accept this proposition (p.389), as did 
McCarthy J. (p.430). The Judicial Committee did not 
express an opinion on this issue, and in Wishear~ North P. 
considered that he was free from any binding authority on 
the point - perhaps overlooking his comments in Europa (No.l). 
He dismissed the argument without discussion (p.323). 
Turner J. distinguished Cecil Brothers Pty Ltd v Federal 
Commissioner of Taxation (1964) 111 CLR 430 on the basis 
that the deductions in that case were genuinely made. He 
stated (p.329): 
"I am of opinion that, at least in New Zealand 
where that essential genuineness is lacking, 
the transaction may be attacked under s.108 -
and conceivably, even in a case in which, for 
one reason o~ another, it may survive attack under 
s.111." 
Thus Turner J. decided that s.108 governed s.111. 
This conclusion, it is submitted, was the correct one, 
4. at p.846 
(2.04) 
(2.03) 
inescapable on a reading of the words of both sections. 1 
The problem lies with his use of the word 'genuine'. 
As s.108 clearly operated to avoid 'actual' transactions, 
he was not using it to distinguish 'sham' arrangements. 
In Wisheart the deductions were 'genuine' in that, they 
were paid out, thus the 'genuineness' to which Turner J. 
was referring must relate to the nature of the arrangement 
- whether it was a 'proper' one. Presumably a 'sole or 
principal' purpose of tax avoidance would destroy the 
'genuineness' of a deduction. 
The conclusion of the Court on this point seems justified, 
however one wonders why the point could not have been made 
earlier in Europa (No.1) instead of opening it up for 
reargument when it had been emphatically dismissed in 
Elmiger by Woodhouse J. 
The Consequences of Annihilation 
It was here that the effect of the Privy Council's 
decision in Mangin was most evident. North P. considered 
that, in view of the comments made in Mangin, what was 
said in Peate's case amounted to unauthorised reconstruction. 
With respect to the two deduction arrangements the only 
problem which arose was that onc e the arrangements were 
avoided the appellants lost the right to claim any 
deductions at all. Turner J. noted this difficulty (p.330) 
but did not feel bound to decide the point as it was not 
argued. 
The arrangement concerning the insurance agency was 
more difficult. Even if the appointment of Marlborough 
Developments Limited to the agency was avoided, this did not 
restore the agency to the appellants as the Insurance Company 
was free to cancel and appoint whomsoever they chose. 
North P. held also that mere proof of physical receipt of 
the income by the appellants was not sufficient (p.326). 
1. s.111 is expressed to allow deductions 'except as 
otherwis e provided in this Act.' 
s.108 applies to 'every' arrangement having a 
purpose of tax avoidance. 
LAW LIBR ARY 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
:2. 05) 
(2.04) 
This was a clear change of position from that taken 
in Marx and Mangin, and led one commentator to suggest that 
s.108 would be deprived of all effect on income-splitting 
arrangements as a result.l 
Turner J. went further, holding that s.108 could not 
operate to avoid arrangements to which the taxpayer was 
not a party (p.327). This limitation does not seem 
justified by the words of the section, and was not followed 
by the Court in CIR v Ashton. The reason why Turner J. 
saw it necessary or desirable to enunciate this qualification 
is not apparent. He certainly did not need to make it, 
as the 'unauthorised reconstruction' argument was sufficient 
to decide this point against the Commissioner. 
Wisheart - Conclusions 
Wisheart's case showed firstly that technical arguments 
relating to the scope of s.108, although limited by Mangin 
were not exhausted. Turner J. added fuel to this fire by 
his new 'legal party' test. It also showed that the 
crucial problem of determining when s.108 applied was 
still as subjective a question as before, in which the 
Judges were inevitably influenced by 'moral precepts.' 
Finally it showed that the consequences of annihilation had 
suddenly become a vital issue, on which it seemed, the Courts 
were prepared to adopt a strict approach. 
The reasons why the Judges were prepared to take a 
strict approach in considering annihilation but not when 
considering what type of arrangements to which the section 
applied, are not inunediately apparent. It may have been 
because the 'annihilation' question was a straight forward 
factual determination for which they had 'legal' authority. 
On the other hand, although they now had 'legal' support 
for the Newton/Turner test, this did not really solve the 
problem, but simply opened up new ones. 1 
1. D.W. McLauchlan. Section 108 : Further Problems 
for the Comi~issioner 5 NZULR 72 at 75 
1. see Lord Wilberforce in Mangin (p.846) and earlier 
para 2.02. 
(2.06) 
2. 07) 
(2.06) 
McKay V CIR: The facts 
The taxpayer was a solicitor and a member of a partnership. 
In 1963 a new partnership was formed and the taxpayer assigned 
half of his share of the income of his partnership capital 
to a family trust which he had just formed. Subsequent 
to the decision in Johnstone v CIR LI96~/ NZLR 833, where 
a similar assignment made by one of the taxpayer's 
partners was held ineffective, the taxpayer exercised a 
power of revocation which he had reserved in the deed of 
assignment. 
The partnership was dissolved in 1966 and a new 
partnership was formed. By a series of contemporaneous 
transactions the taxpayer lent money to the family trust, 
interest free and repayable on demand, which the trust 
on-lent to the partnership at interest of ten per cent. 
In 1967, when it appeared that the Commissioner 
would attack the arrangemen~ the taxpayer called up his loan 
and lent the money directly to the partnership, assigning 
absolutely to the trust the income therefrom. 
The case concerned the effectiveness of the second 
and third transactions. 
The Application of the 'Purpose' Test 
The appellanfs principal contention in the Court of 
Appeal was that the arrangements attacked by the Commissioner 
were referable to ordinary business or family dealing. No 
argument was made as to the consequences of annihilation, 
thus the main question in issue was the application of the 
Newton/Turner test as approved by the Privy Council in Mangin. 
The appellant argued that the overt acts in the 
impugned transactions were referable to ordinary business 
or family dealing. Turner P. accepte~·~ith respect to the 
1966 transaction, that the dissolution of the partnership, 
the advances by the partners and the interest of ten per cent 
to be paid upon those advances, were so referable and thus 
could not be attacked. However he considered that the fact 
(2.07) 
that the appellant provided the advance by way of a 
family trust was not acceptable. He stated (p.597): 
"I cannot find, in the evidence, or in my 
own experience, or in any submission made 
by Counsel, any firm ground on which to 
stand in finding this group of transactions 
explainable by ordinary business or family 
dealing, and I think that they speak of 
income tax so loudly and clearly as to be 
brought compulsively within the purview 
of the section." 
Once again, no indication is given as to what is required 
to make a transaction 'ordinary.' The Judge's bwn experience' 
can hardly be a desirable gauge. 
In the Supreme Court Wild C.J. had considered these 
transactions to be capable of explanation as ordinary 
business dealing (p.734), but he concluded that they were 
nevertheless caught by reason of the way in which the 
transactions were implemented. Turner P. expressly 
disagreed with this approach (p.597). His Honour saw the 
background provided by the previous transactions and the 
actual terms of the later ones as sufficient to bring 
the transaction within s.108. 
It is interesting to consider the 'background' to which 
Turner P. referred. In 1963 the appellant had assigned to 
the trust one half of the income which he would derive from 
the use of his share of the partnership capital. He 
reserved a power to rescind the assignment which meant that 
the arrangement was within the scope of s.105(2) (b). 
When the Commissioner successfully attacked a similar 
arrangement made by McKay's partner on the basis that it 
was an ineffective assignment1 McKay exercised his power and 
rescinded the settlement. 
Turner P. commented throughout his judgment that the 
1. Johnstone v CIR fC96~/ NZLR 83 
(2.08) 
(2.07) 
1963 transactions were attacked under s.108, which 
they clearly were not. He stated (p.602): 
"I am willing to notice, as a relevant fact, 
that when the Commissioner decided to attack 
the 1963 transactions under s.108 they were 
at once rescinded ... " 
It would seem that the background which Turner P. saw 
as giving evidence of a 'persistently recurring' theme of 
tax avoidance was misunderstood. The 1963 transaction 
was never attacked by the Commissioner under s.108, nor 
was the possibility of such an attack the reason for the 
I 
appellants rescission of it. Once this background is 
removed the question arises as to whether the evidence was 
sufficient to dismiss the contention that the arrangements 
attacked were ordinary business or family dealing. 
The decision in McKay may well be correct. As 
Speight J. noted, (p.604) the attacked transactions in 
themselves may not be explicable as ordinary business or 
family dealing. However the approach of Turner P. detracts 
from his conclusion. He went out of his way to disagree 
with the Chief Justice, thus basing his main reason for 
finding s.108 applicable on the background of the 
prior transactions. The 'implementation' test of the 
Chief Justice was fully justified both by precede nt 2 and 
the facts under consideration, and is less open to 
criticism. 
Conclusions 
The other argument for the appellant was that s.108 
could not operate to avoid assignments of income which 
were not caught by s.105. Turner P. quickly disposed of 
this argument, - correctly, it is submitted - on the 
basis that s.105 is not cast in a positive form and thus 
2.In Newton implementation was considered of utmost 
importance - note Denning's test. 
(2.08) 
does not 'permit' anything. It is silent as to the 
assignment of income for more than seven years, thus 
leaving s.108 to govern those transactions. 
A final point of interest in McKay's case concerns 
the appellant's submission that the 1967 transaction 
should be allowed because it was an absolute irrevocable 
gift of income. Turner P. appeared to accept this argument, 
yet he considered he was unable to decide in the appellant's 
favour. He stated (p.601): 
" ..... A gift of income only, reserving the 
capital to the assignor, is one which is 
different in its nature from a gift of 
capital ..... 
At one time I was not so firmly of this 
opinion; but the correction administered 
to my former views by the majority of the 
Judicial Committe e in Mangin ..... 
is one which I must loyally accept." 
Thus the importance of McKay's case in the development 
of the judicial glosses on s.108 lies in the apparent 
disapproval of conside ring 'implementation' to determine 
the purpose of the transaction, and assertion of the 
importance of looking at the 'background' to determine 
that purpose. Such a test, it is submitted, requires an 
overly subjective consideration. The Judge must himself 
determine what is the 'background' to be taken into 
account, and further, what complexion is to be put on it. 
Turner P. considered this approach justified on the basis 
that the three transactions were part of an overall tax plan. 
Yet at any one time only one arrangeme nt was in existence 
and they were each totally independent. Such an approach 
can be seen as a serious infringement on the rights of a 
taxpayer to organise his activities as he likes, so long 
as he remains within the Act: 
"If the Judges allow their interpretation of 
a separate and ob j ectively valid arrange ment to 
be influence d to a ma rked degree by inf erences 
drawn from the t axpayer's past activities, 
th2n it is suggested tha t the y are getting 
very n ear t o dec iding the cas e on the basis of 
'motive.' " 3 
3. Hansen Family Trus ts - Normal Dealing or Tax Avoidance' 
5 NZULR 377 at 379. 
(2.09) 
( 2. 0 9) 
Martin V IRC 
This case was heard in the Court of Appeal by 
McCarthy P., Richmond and White J.J. The facts are 
set out in detail in McMullin J's judgment in the 
Supreme Court, il97~/ NZLR 340, but do not warrant 
discussion here. 
The appeai was based on one general proposition, 
that the arrangement attacked by the CoTIL~issioner was not 
effected for the sole or principal purpose of tax 
avoidance. The Court dismissed the appeal, a result which 
would appear justified on the facts of the case. However 
the approach of the Court was suspect. McCarthy P's 
judgment apparently relied on the motives of the appellant 
rather than the purpose of the transaction. The learned 
Judge stated (p.709): 
"It is not surprising, having regard to the 
features of the evidence which I have just 
outlined and the plainly unsatisfactory 
reasons which the appellant gave in evidence 
•.... that McMullin J. felt unable to accept 
the appellant's testimony in many important 
respects ..... I think that credibility was 
fundamentally involved in the basic conclusions 
upon which McMullin J's judgme nt is founded . 
..... In my view this Court cannot, in the 
light of the evidence, ups e t those conclusions, 
and in particular that relating to the purpose 
with which the scheme was undertaken." 
This approach is plainly contrary to the formulations of the 
test thus far propounded by the Courts, which all emphatically 
reject the possibility of considering the motives of the 
taxpayer in order to ascertain the purpose of his arrangement. 
McCarthy J. himself recognised this by adopting in Elmiger 
and again in Marx, the Newton predication test in order to 
determine 'purpose.' In Ashton 1 s 1 case McCarthy P. recognised 
the fallacy inherent in this reasoning, although he was not 
prepared to accept that the approach he took in Martin was 
wrong. 
1. for furth e r discussion of this point, see infra, 
para /_2.11/ 
(2.10) 
(2.10) 
CIR v Gerard - A change of Heart 
The facts in Gerard's case bear a close similarity 
to those of both Marx and Mangin. The arrangements attacked 
by the Commissioner involved the lease of various paddocks 
to a family trust, as in Mangin. The taxpayer was employed 
by the trustees to manage the paddocks, however he was 
careful not to ever himself receive the income, which 
was paid directly to the trustees. 
In the Court of Appeal the respondent accepted that 
the arrangement must be seen as a device for avoiding tax 
by reason of the decisions in Marx and Mangin, thus he 
restricted his arguments to the consequence s of annihilation. 
This involved two questions : firstly, what steps were to be 
rendered void, and secondly, what were the consequences 
of that avoidance. 
The first question involved consideration of Turner J's 
'legal party' argument. The Commissioner conte nded that 
the family trust should be avoided, but the respondent 
argued that as he was not a party to the deed of trust 
it could not be set aside. McCarthy P. found it unneccessary 
to decide the issue, preferring to reserve his opinion 
for another case (p.282). 
McCarthy P. considered that once the arrangements 
were avoided the trustees were left with the proceeds of 
the crops. The respondent could be regarded as having a right 
of action for restitution of the proceeds but could in 
no way be said to have derived the income and thus was not 
taxable on it. 
The Commissioner conte nded that in the circumstances 
a constructive trust could be implied. McCarthy P. rejected 
this on the basis that it was an equi t able remedy and that 
to find a trust would be unjustifiahle legislating. 
However, of more relevance is the apparent change of approach 
(2.10) 
of the Court of Appeal, and notably of McCarthy P. While 
in Marx and Mangin he was prepared to adopt a "corrunonsense" 
approach he appears in ~erard to have completely reversed 
his stand. The reason he gives for this change of heart 
is the Privy Council's judgment in Mangin, as interpreted 
in Wisheart. The consequence of this interpretation seems 
to be that: 
" ..•. the - perhaps coincidental - decision on 
the part of the payers as to whom to send the 
cheques is decisive when in all other respects 
the arrangeme nt, its purpose and its implementation 
are virtually the same." 2 
It is submitted that McCarthy P's change in approach 
was not completely referable to the precedent of Mangin 
and Wisheart, but was also influenc~d by his growing 
impatience with the failure of the legislature to assist 
the Courts by remedying the defects which had so often 
been pointed out. He stated (p.281): 
"The section is notoriously diffi cult. It 
cannot be given a literal application, for 
that would .... result in the avoidance of 
transactions which were obviously not aime d 
at by the section. So the Courts h ave h a d 
to place glos s es on the statutory l a nguage in 
order that the bounds mi ght be h e ld r e asona bly 
fairly between the inla nd revenue authoritj es 
and taxpayers. But no one sugge sts tha t this 
is satisfactory , especially as o n e result has 
been that the Privy Council has b e en forc e d in 
a number of cases to assume the task, rightly 
one for the Legislatur~ of provid ing the tests 
according to which our people are to be taxed. 
As Wilson J. points out, arguments on the 
application of s.108 are now rare l y , if ever, 
based on the t e xt of the section itse lf; they 
are mainly, if not wholly, centre d on the 
glosses placed by the Courts on the text." 
It does seem illogical that Gerard's case arrives 
at a completely opposite result than Marx did, on almost 
2. L. McKay. Secti.o n 108 - Ye t More Problems for the 
Conmissione l:'." 5 NZULR 383, 387. 
(2.10) 
identical facts and without any express reference to the 
inconsistency. 
Perhaps McCarthy P. realised that if anything were 
to be done to alleviate the Courts' problems, the Commissioner 
would have to fail in his campaign. On the other hand, 
perhaps the difference in the approach of the respondent 
was of significance. As noted earlier, the respondent 
did not attempt to argue that his transactions did not 
have the required 'purpose.' This meant that the Court 
was only required to look at the 'legal' questions of 
annihilation,which did not require the application of 
the subjective considerations inherent in answering the 
purpose/effect issue. With the question thus limited 
perhaps the Court felt 'safer' in using the strict approach 
to statutory interpretation evident in other cases. 
It is submitted that this latter explanat ion may 
be closer to the truth, especially when the decision of 
the same Court in Ashton v CIR,delivered in the next week, is 
considered. 
(2.11) 
(2.11) 
CIR V Ashton 
Briefly, the facts were that Ashton and Wheelans 
were accountants in partnership. They had, as a source 
of income, an arrangement with some finance companies 
whereby the accountants received commissions and office 
charges for organising and overseeing financing 
arrangements. The arrangement was altered by the 
respondents so that the commissions and charges became 
payable to family trusts of the taxpayers. Mr Ashton 
and a solicitor were trustees for Mr Wheelan's family 
trust and vice versa. The Commissioner attacked this 
arrangement. 
In the Supreme Court Wilson J. found for the appellants 
on the basis that the arrangements were referable to 
ordinary family dealings and were not entered into for the 
principal purpose of avoiding tax. 
The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment of Wilson J. 
That Judge had determined the dominant purpose of the 
taxpayers on the basis of the evidence they gave. McCarthy P. 
held that such evidence was irrelevant, that 'purpose' 
must be determined by what the transactions effected, 
without regard to evidence of the taxpayers. 
This approach seems contrary to that taken by McCarthy P. 
in Marti~, where he appeared to place great weight on the 
respondent~ testimony. 1 Indeed, in Ashton itself he 
appeared to have regard to the evidence given by the 
respondent. He said (p.326): 
"Of more importance, however, is the 
evidence given by each objector as to 
the use made of the funds which he 
received from the relative family trust." 
and later, 
"In particular this piece of Mr Wheelans' 
evidence is of some importance." 
In both these instances the learned President relied on 
1. This point is discussed more fully supra, para (2.09) 
(2.12) 
(2.11) 
the evidence to draw an inference adverse to the appellants, 
as he did in Martin. One wonders then, if the Court 
is only to have regard to the taxpayer's evidence if it 
does not believe him, or if it is disadvantageous to him. 
McCarthy P. recognised (p.328) that the rearrangement 
of the partnership activities in itself could be considered 
'ordinary,' or at least not 'uncommon in professional 
experience.' However he stated (p.328): 
"The question we have to decide however is 
whether it can be predicated from the way 
the transaction was implemented that it was 
entered into for the purpose of avoiding 
tax." 
This appears to be exactly the approach of which Turner P. 
expressly disapproved in McKay. 2 For the Court in 
Ashton it was the way the transaction was implemented 
which made it 'highly artificial' and open to attack 
under s.108, despite the fact that the background gave 
evidence of a desire on the part of the respondents to 
provide for their families as a principal purpose. Had 
Turner P. been a member of the Court in Ashton it may 
have been that the decision would have been different. 
The Consequences of Annihilation 
Once the Court had decided that the transactions in 
Ashton fell within the scope of s.108 the question of 
annihilation had to be dealt with. The first objection 
raised was the proposition first enunciated by Turner J. 
in Wisheart, 3 that s.108 could only apply to avoid 
arrangements to which the taxpayer was a legal party. The 
Court refused to accept this proposition, stating (p.329): 
2. 
3. 
"We see no reason to restrict L~-108'§7 
operation, in cases when documents are 
involved, to those documents to which 
the objector is a party. We read it as 
extending to others, if it be shown that 
the document was procured by or with the 
connivance of the- taxpayer and as a step in 
the whole scheme. The reciprocal trust deeds 
here are within that test - they were the 
key documents in the tax-avoidance arrangement." 
See para (2.07) 
Discussed supra para (2.04) 
(2.12) 
This approach may be preferable on a plain reading of 
the section. However, there would appear to have been 
a clear majority in the Wisheart Court - if not 
unanjmity - deciding the legal party issue in favour 
of the taxpayers. Generally the Court of Appeal 
considers itself bound by its previous decisions. Further, 
if one considers the attitude the Court was prepared 
to take nine days earlier in Gerard in refusing to 
find s.108 effective it seems curious that they did 
not here again in very similar circumstances, seize 
upon the chance to show the defects of the section. 
Even with the Ashton trust deeds annihilated the 
Commissioner still faced major difficulties in showing 
that the income was in fact derived by the respondents. 
They never received or had the money passing through 
their hands. Each was trustee, with the solicitor, 
for the other's family trust. Once the transactions 
and trusts were avoided there was no basis on which the 
commissions could be seen as being payable to, er 
derived by, the taxpayers in that capacity. The 
situation can be compared with that in Gerard. McCarthy P. 
considered that the fact that the taxpayer had not 
received the income himself at any stage was concl~sive 
in his favour. 
However, in Ashton the Court came to the opposite 
conclusion. They were prepared to ignore the fact 
that not only did each taxpayer receive (as trustee) 
the money for the other's family trust, but also that 
the solicitor was named as a payee on the commission 
cheques. This in itself seems remarkable, but what is 
far more astounding is the fact that they did so without 
comment. The first seven pages of the judgment are 
devoted entirely to a discussion of the facts and the 
'purpose' issue. The problem of the annihilation 
consequences is dealt with in half a page. McCarthy P. 
(2.13) 
(2.12) 
stated (p. 329) : 
"We come now to the troublesome question 
of annihilation. The crucial documents 
in each case here are the deed of trust, 
the revocation of the old appointment, 
and the new appointment. If these are 
eliminated, then for the reasons which we 
have already given the income received 
by the two respondents and their solicitor 
or agent must be treated as having been 
derived by them and taxable accordingly." 
(emphasis added) 
The striking feature which arises from this statement 
is that at no earlier stage in his judgment did McCarthy P. 
refer to annihilation or the consequences which would 
follow it. For the reasons mentioned earlier the 
annihilation problem was by no means a straightforward 
one. In fact, it would seem to have been the strongest 
point in the respondents' favour. To have dismissed 
this argument in this fashion is inexplicable, especially 
in view of the decision the same Court gave in Ge~ard 
a few days earlier. McCarthy P. must be taken to have 
impliedly followed the approach of Peate's, case, 
which North P. had labelled as 'unauthorised reconstruction' 
in Wisheart, and which McCarthy P. himself had rejected 
in Gerard. 
Conclusions 
In looking at Gerard and Ashton together it is 
difficult to credit that exactly the same Court, dealing 
with identical issues argued by experienced Counsel, could 
produce such different results. Certainly, Ashton 
was argued on two fronts - both applicability and annihila-
tion - whereas Gerard concentrated on annihilation. 
There is no logical or 'legal' explanation apparent. 
If there is a 'reason' it must lie with the attitudes of 
the Judges themselves. That the Judges were unaware of 
the change - from Gerard to Ashton - is unlikely. If that 
is accepted, it is remarkable that the attitudes could 
change in nine days, and in all three Judge s. No two 
section 108 cases provide such a vivid, and legally 
inexplicable, contrast between approaches taken to the 
section. 
(3.01) 
(3.01) 
The Europa Cases 
Discussion of the decisions in Europa (No.l) and 
Europa (No.2) has been thus far omitted from this 
paper. This is because the decisions, as far as they 
relate to s.108, are inconsistent with the developing 
line of cases, and are even difficult to reconcile 
with each other. Europa(No.l) was heard in the Court 
of Appeal after Mangin. All three Judges dismissed 
. s.108 with the minimum of discussion and virtually 
no attempt to apply the section to the facts of the case. 
Both North P. (p.389) and McCarthy J. (p.430) expressed 
doubts as to whether s.108 could apply to bar deductions 
otherwise allowable under s.111. This argument had been 
abondoned by counsel for the taxpayer in Elmiger and was 
subsequently emphatically denied by North P. and 
Turner J. in Wisheart. 1 Turner J. suggested {p.414) 
that the incorporation of a company could not be an 
arrangement and thus avoided by s.108. Yet in Peate's 
case the Privy Council had avoided a company without 
any such doubts. 
McCarthy J. appeared to dismiss the application of 
s.108 on the basis that the arrangements did not result 
in a loss of New Zealand tax and did not have the prescribed 
effect for that reason. This is overlooking the point 
that the deductions made by Europa under s.111 could be 
attacked - they were clearly part of an arrangement 
'resulting in a loss of New Zealand tax. 1 
In Europa (No .2) facts were adduced to show that under 
the 1964 contracts Europa could have insisted upon a coIT~ercial 
benefit rather than continue Pan Eastern benefit. 2 
However, McCarthy P. saw s.108 as still completely 
inapplicable and he dismissed the issue without discussion. 
1. See supra, para (2.03) 
2. Recognised in Europa (No .1) McCarthy J. p.424. 
(3.01) 
It is certainly curious that the same Court 
which painstakingly considered the operation of s.108 
in Elmiger and Marx could in the Europa cases, dismiss 
it in such an off-hand and superficial manner. There 
were many similarities between the Elmiger and the 
Europa facts, yet the reasoning of the Court in these 
cases is poles apart. 
It would seem that the essential difference 
lies in the fact that the Euro~ decisions concerned 
commercial 'arms-length' transactions and the Court 
of Appeal could not accept that s.108 could apply to 
these. It is notable that none of the other cases 
on s.108 involved 'business' dealings - all concerned 
family arrangements. 
There is nothing in the wording of s.108 which 
would support the exclusion of commercial arrangements 
from its ambit. Thus here again the distinction must 
be found in the attitudes of the Judges themselves. As 
Lord Upjohn stated in IRC v Brebner f1962/ 2 AC 18, 30 that: 
" ..... when the question of carrying out a 
genuine commercial transaction .... is 
conside r e d, the fact that there are t wo 
ways o f carry ing it out, - one by paying 
the max imum amount of tax, the other by 
paying no, or much less tax - it would 
be quite wrong as a necessary consequence 
to draw the infe rence that in adopting 
the latte r course one of the main objects 
is, for the purposes of the section, 
avoidance of tax . No com.rne rcial ma n in 
his sense s is going to carry out coffiIT'.ercial 
trans a ctions exc e pt upon the footing of 
paying the small e st amount of tax involved." 
This attitude seems to have found favour with our 
Court of Appeal. Instead of starting with the attitude 
that the arrangeme nts were 'obvious and deliberate' tax 
avoiding sche me s the Judges saw astute business dealing. 
Their approa ch in deciding whether s.108 could then 
apply was thu s from a completely different position. 
In this paper i t has been sugge sted that interpretation 
(3.01) 
of s.108 inevitably involved the Judges applying 
·their own subjective attitudes to tax avoidance. 
The difference between the approach taken in the 
cases discussed in this paper and the approach 
taken in the Europa decisions is a clear example of 
the effect the judicial attitudes have had. 
Conclusion 
In considering these ten Court of Appeal decisions 
involving s.108 it becomes apparent that both the 
section itself and the decisions made on the section 
are hard to justify. 
There can be lengthy debate as to whether the 
fault lies with the legislature or with the Courts. 
Dr I.L.M. Richardson considers that a general 
s.108 is necessary 
He states (30 NZ 
anti-avoidance provision such as 
to protect the taxation system. 
Journal of Public Administration 1, 10) : 
"/~.1087 is of a ..... general nature 
and is-in my view some recognition of 
the need in a modern tax system to 
buttress specific anti-avoidance 
provisions by a general provision." 
It is not the purpose of this paper to decide for or 
against this argument. Whatever the benefits of 
a general anti-avoidance section in a tax system, 
s.108 simply did not provide any of them. 
"There is no question but that judicial 
politics, philosophies and perceptions 
played an important role in the 
interpretation of the scope of old s.108 
•.... The fact that such philosophies 
differ among the Judges and in themselves 
cause at least initial uncertainties 
is concern enough; but more significant 
is that after a period oi disagreement 
followed by one of synthesis and crystallisation 
it was .... they to a far greater extent than 
the philosophies of the legislature that 
represent(ed) our societal standpoint on 
tax avoidance." 1 
There is no doubt that, as McCarthy P. himself 
pointed out in Gerard, s.108 simply became non-justiciable. 
The judgrnents of the Court of Appeal initially exhibited 
some enthusiasm in the Judges in grappling with the section, 
1. L. McKay LI97§7 NZLJ 238 at 243. 
but this turned to frustration. Much of the 
blame for this can be attributed to the Legislature, 
for forcing the Courts to attempt to interpret on a legal 
basis a section which in many respects defied such 
interpretation. The Commissioner was also at fault in 
his approach to the section. Elmiger was clearly a 
test case. It was painstakingly selected from 
hundreds ·of other possible tax avoidance schemes as 
the one most likely to arouse distaste in the Judges 
and persuade them to invoke s.108. Once such a 
landmark decision had been given, the Commissioner 
should have followed with the other cases in rapid 
succession. The effect of the delays between the 
cases contributed to the growing frustration and 
inconsistencies which resulted. 
Another culprit in the demise of s.108 was the 
Privy Council. The Court of Appeal has almost always 
faithfully attempted to follow the opinions of the 
Privy Council, and did so with respect to s.108. However, 
it makes a mockery of the whole judicial system when 
the Privy Council fee·ls able, as it did in Ashton and 
Europa (No.2), to disregard the line of New Zealand 
authorities and even its own earlier opinions. 2 
However, in the writer's opinion, some of the 
blame must rest with the Judiciary itself. Firstly, 
although in all but one of the cases the Court of 
Appeal was unanimous, in only Ashton's case was a 
single judgment delivered. It is submitted that 
much of the confusion which resulted from the cases 
occurred because the differing attitudes of the Judges 
shone through in their judgments and thus although the 
conclusions reached were the same, the steps taken 
were open to different interpretations. 
Take Elmiger for example. The Court agreed that the 
arrangement was caught. If a single judgment had been 
2. for a critical ~nalysis of these two Privy Council decisions see {197§/ NZLJ 33, and 218. 
delivered in that case much of the uncertainty and 
the differences in approach exhibited there and 
argued in later cases would have been avoided. It 
has already been commented 3 that the precedent system 
allows moral judgments in one case become legal 
tests in another. Perhaps this could have been effective 
to confine s.108 within defined and certain limits if 
the Judges themselves had presented,whenever they 
agreed on a result, a united front. 
3. supra, para (1.08) 
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